Wyoming Law Review
Volume 20

Number 2

Article 6

2020

Reforming the Federal Election Commission: Storable Voting
Alvin Padilla-Babilonia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Padilla-Babilonia, Alvin (2020) "Reforming the Federal Election Commission: Storable Voting," Wyoming
Law Review: Vol. 20 : No. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Padilla-Babilonia: Reforming the Federal Election Commission

Wyoming Law Review
VOLUME 20

2020

NUMBER 2

REFORMING THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION: STORABLE VOTING
Alvin Padilla-Babilonia *
I.
II.

Introduction.......................................................................................287
FEC: Structure and Deadlocks..........................................................290
A. Original Structure and Amendments After Buckley v. Valeo.............290
B. Voting Thresholds and Their Purposes..............................................292
C. Structural Collapse.........................................................................293
III. Structural Redesign: Odd Number Commission and
Non-Deference Approach...................................................................297
A. Odd-Number Commission..............................................................298
B. Non-Deference Approach................................................................302
IV. Storable Voting: A Path Towards Reform?........................................305
A. Storable Voting: The Idea................................................................307
B. Storable Voting in the FEC.............................................................308
C. Agenda Setting, Design, and Calendar.............................................311
D. Policy Goals...................................................................................314
V. Conclusion..........................................................................................316

I. Introduction
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has the important task of enforcing
and regulating campaign finance law. It has failed miserably. It has been called
the “Failure to Enforce Commission,”1 a “toothless tiger,”2 “FEC-less,”3 and “The
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico Law School; Fox International Fellow
at Yale Graduate School. LL.M., Yale Law School, 2019; J.D., University of Puerto Rico School of
Law, 2016; B.A., University of Puerto Rico, 2013. Thank you to Bruce Ackerman for his guidance
and encouragement. Thank you also to the editors of the Wyoming Law Review for their dedication
and thoroughness.
1

149 Cong. Rec. 17, 694 (2003).

2

135 Cong. Rec. 21, 329 (1989).

Charles R. Babcock, FEC–less . . . ; Real Campaign Reform Will Give the Watchdog Agency
New Teeth, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1992, at C5.
3
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Little Agency That Can’t.”4 One target of criticism is the structure of the FEC.
According to its enabling act, the Commission consists of six members who will
serve for a single term of six years. No more than three members can belong to
the same political party, which in practice means that there is a three-member
bloc from the Republican Party and a three-member bloc from the Democratic
Party. However, a four-member majority is necessary for most significant actions,
including conducting investigations, enforcement through civil action, issuing
advisory opinions, and rule-making.5 This commitment to absolute majority rule
was established so that the FEC can only act when there is bipartisan support.
This institutional design has been perverted in this era of peak polarization.
A lack of four votes—because of 3-to-3 ties or when the vacancies are not
filled—leads to deadlocks, a situation where there is no majority for any action.6
Deadlocks are so frequent that the law on the books is substantially different than
the law in action.7 Because a tie prevents the Commission from investigating
violations, deadlocks have, in practice, changed the rules governing campaign
finance. Disclosure requirements are ignored, “independent” expenditures are
actually coordinated with candidates, and foreign money continues to influence
national elections.8
Surprisingly, it is not that each bloc refuses to investigate the violations of
campaign finance laws incurred by members of their own political party. Instead,
there is a growing tendency of commissioners following their parties’ views on
campaign finance regulations: commissioners from the Republican Party vote
against their enforcement, and commissioners from the Democratic Party vote

Benjamin Weiser & Bill McAllister, The Little Agency that Can’t: Election–law Enforcer is
Weak by Design, Paralyzed by Division, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1997, at A1.
4

5

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) (2018).

Editorial Board, The Federal Election Commission Needs Commissioners, Bloomberg:
Opinion (Sept. 20, 2019, 4:30 AM), www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-20/fecparalyzed-by-vacancies-as-2020-presidential-election-nears [https://perma.cc/4YUP-W5YR].
6

7
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 15–16 (1910)
(describing the difference “between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man
and those that in fact govern them”).

Anna Massoglia, State of Money in Politics: Billion-Dollar ‘Dark Money’ Spending is Just the
Tip of the Iceberg, OpenSecrets (Feb. 21, 2019, 11:20 AM), www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/02/
somp3-billion-dollar-dark-money-tip-of-the-iceberg/[https://perma.cc/UH9T-Z8J4]; Adam
Wollner & National Journal, 10 Ways Super PACs and Campaigns Coordinate, Even Though They’re
Not Allowed To, The Atlantic (Sept. 27, 2015), www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/10ways-super-pacs-and-campaigns-coordinate-even-though-theyre-not-allowed-to/436866/[https://
perma.cc/8NH2-LPRG]; Michael Sozan, Ending Foreign-Influenced Corporate Spending in U.S.
Elections, Center for American Progress (Nov. 21, 2019, 12:01 AM), www.americanprogress.org/
issues/democracy/reports/2019/11/21/477466/ending-foreign-influenced-corporate-spending-u-selections/[https://perma.cc/YB6U-RS6N].
8
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in favor.9 Thus, the FEC has become ineffectual. It is failing to enforce and
regulate campaign finance law. This should not mean, however, that Congress
must eliminate the FEC.10 Instead, we must think of new institutional reforms
to reduce deadlocks in the FEC and increase enforcement and compliance with
campaign finance regulations.
So far, all proposed reforms preserve majority rule in the FEC—a majority
of commissioners need to agree for the FEC to investigate and enforce
campaign finance law. The most common proposal is to change the number of
commissioners to an odd number of either three, five, or seven. These proposals
tend to have an independent as the tiebreaker: someone who does not belong to
either major political party.11 I will call this reform the odd-number commission.
Other reformers question how independent such an individual can be and want
to keep the even number of commissioners to avoid one-party control of the
FEC.12 Moreover, they maintain that the FEC can only investigate and enforce
campaign finance regulations when there is a majority. When there is no majority,
however, they propose that the federal judiciary should be the tiebreaker, rather
than deferring to the FEC. I will call this the non-deference approach. These
reforms do not dispute that a majority of commissioners need to agree for the
FEC to investigate and enforce campaign finance law. But while the supporters of
a commission with an odd number of members seek to have a decisive tiebreaking
vote, under the non-deference approach the federal courts settle the issue when
there is no majority decision in the FEC. A more modest proposal is to lower the
threshold number of votes in the earlier stages of investigation. For instance, the
FEC could determine there is “reason to believe” that a violation occurs with three
votes rather than four.13 Lowering this threshold would allow alleged violations
to be further investigated, even without a majority of commissioners. Yet, this
reform does not stop the Commission from deadlocking in a future vote because
there is no majority for action or inaction. But what if decisions could be made
through a voting system different from majority rule? Could a new voting system
reduce deadlocks while keeping the even number of commissioners?
My proposal for breaking the FEC’s gridlock requires adopting storable voting.
Storable voting is a multiple-issue electoral mechanism that is an alternative
9
Ann Ravel, Office of Comm’r, Fed. Election Comm’n, Dysfunction and Deadlock:
The Enforcement Crisis at the Federal Election Commission Reveals the Unlikelihood of
Draining the Swamp 1, 7– 8 (2017).
10
Note, Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131 Harv. L.
Rev. 1421, 1436 (2018).
11

See For the People Act of 2019, H.R.1, 116th Cong. § 6002 (2019).

Daniel P. Tokaji, Beyond Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference, in Democracy by
People: Reforming Campaign Finance in America 172, 188 (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K.
Kuhner eds. 2018).
12

the

Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Obstacles to Effective Enforcement of the Federal
Election Campaign Act, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 575, 592 (2000).
13
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to majority rule.14 Voters can distribute their storable votes among different
proposals and across time, voting on several binary issues (Yes/No questions)
according to the intensity of their preferences. Originally intended to promote
minority rights,15 it can also be used in a context like the FEC to reduce deadlocks.
Storable voting could increase enforcement and compliance of campaign finance
regulations without disrupting the partisan balance (odd-number commission) or
resorting to the federal judiciary (non-deference approach). Under my proposal,
the voting threshold of the “reason to believe” determination will be lowered to
three votes, rather than four, but later decisions—probable cause, settlement, and
notification to authorities—will be decided through storable voting.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part II explains the structure of the
FEC, the purposes behind its structure, and how the FEC’s structure eventually
led to an increasing number of deadlocks and the non-enforcement of campaign
finance regulations. Part III examines the different proposals that address the
problem of the ineffectiveness of the FEC due to deadlocks. Different policy goals
animate these proposals, but while the odd-number commission fails to stop one
party from controlling the FEC, the non-deference approach will not successfully
increase enforcement and compliance with the law. Part IV discusses how the FEC
could implement storable voting to decrease gridlock and increase enforcement
and compliance, while maintaining the even number of commissioners. Storable
voting can reduce the deadlocks of the FEC and increase enforcement and
compliance with campaign finance regulations.

II. FEC: Structure and Deadlocks
A. Original Structure and Amendments After Buckley v. Valeo
Through the amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
of 1971, the FEC was created in 1974 to enforce and regulate campaign finance
law.16 The Commission’s structure was the subject of passionate discussion,
particularly on the issue of how to make it more or less insulated from congressional
influence. The Senate wanted a powerful Commission with seven members
nominated by the President. The House of Representatives, however, wanted to
exercise more control, despite calling it an “independent” agency.17 It proposed
that the Commission be made up of only four commissioners, all nominated by
congressional leadership.

14

Alessandra Casella, Storable Votes: Protecting the Minority Vote xviii-xxi (2012).

15

Id. at xxix.

See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, sec. 208(a),
§ 308–14, 88 Stat. 1263, 1279–85.
16

17

See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1438, at 309–11 (1974).
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In the end, Congress settled on six commissioners: two appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate with recommendations by the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, two appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, upon recommendation by its respective majority and minority
leaders, and the last two appointed by the President of the United States.18 They
all required confirmation by both Houses of Congress, rather than only by the
Senate, reflecting once again the desire for congressional control of the agency.19
The law also established that each nominator—the President pro tempore of the
Senate, the House Speaker, and the President—could not propose two nominees
from the same political party.20 Finally, while the first commissioners would
serve shorter terms, the typical term for commissioners would be a single term
of six years, but they could stay past that term if their successor had not yet
taken office.21
This appointment scheme process was invalidated in 1976.22 In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court concluded that the powers vested in the commissioners
of the FEC could only be exerted by “Officers of the United States” within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause.23 As such, each of the commissioners
must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.24 Shortly
thereafter, Congress amended the FECA to comply with Buckley.25 Now, the six
commissioners, of which not more than three can be affiliated with the same
political party, must be nominated by the President and consented to by the
Senate.26 The amendments maintained that each commissioner will serve for
a single term of six years or until his successor takes his place.27 The law does
not define who can serve as a commissioner: it only states they “shall be chosen
on the basis of their experience, integrity, impartiality, and good judgment.”28
The only limitation is that, at the time of the appointment, commissioners
cannot be “elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, legislative
or judicial branch.”29

18

Sec. 208(a), § 310(a)(1), 88 Stat. at 1280 –81.

19

See id. at 1281.

20

Id.

21

52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2) (2018).

22

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

23

Id. at 140.

24

Id. at 143.

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a)(1),
90 Stat. 475, 475 (1976).
25

26

52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1).

27

See id. § 30106(a)(2).

28

Id. § 30106 (a)(3).

29

Id.
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The FEC has the power to elect a chairperson and vice-chairperson from
among its members, but they cannot be from the same political party. These
positions will only last for a nonrenewable term of one year.30 The Commission
must also appoint a staff director and a general counsel.31 The staff director can,
with the approval of the Commission, appoint additional personnel.

B. Voting Thresholds and Their Purposes
The FEC’s main task is to enforce the limitations and prohibitions on
contributions and expenditures, and oversee the compliance with campaign
finance disclosure.32 To achieve this, the enabling act recognizes multiple powers
that can be classified in two camps: (1) those that do not require a majority
of the commissioners, and (2) those that require the affirmative vote of four
commissioners.33 The first group includes the power to administer an oath or
affirmation and to require subpoenas, among others.34 Because these actions
do not require an absolute majority, I will focus on the second group, where
deadlocks are more common.
The second group compromises the four most significant faculties of
the FEC. First, the FEC can conduct investigations and report willful violations
to law enforcement authorities.35 During the investigation, the Commission can
pursue a settlement with the respondent, known as a conciliation agreement, but
it cannot impose a direct penalty.36 Second, if the FEC cannot reach an agreement,
it can, through its general counsel, bring a civil action that enforces campaign
finance regulations.37 Third, the FEC can render advisory opinions requested
by persons, candidates, or authorized committees.38 Finally, the Commission
can make, amend, and repeal any regulation needed to carry out campaign
finance law.39 At first glance, these specific authorities appear to empower the
Commission to successfully regulate campaign finance. However, these four
areas—enforcement, civil actions, advisory opinions, and rule-making—require

30

Id. § 30106(a)(5).

31

Id. § 30106 (f )(1).

32

See id. § 30107.

33

Id. § 30106(c).

34

Id. § 30107(a)(2)–(3).

35

Id. § 30107(a)(9).

Fed. Election Comm’n, Guidebook
Enforcement Process 5 (2012).
36

37

52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6).

38

Id. § 30107(a)(7).

39

Id. § 30107(a)(8).

for

Complainants
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the affirmative votes of four members of the Commission.40 Since no more than
three members can belong to the same political party, this means that there must
be bipartisan support for the most significant actions of the FEC.41 Thus, when
there is a 3-3 tie—for example, on whether to investigate a candidate for violating
campaign finance regulations—the FEC cannot carry forward and must close
the investigation.42 In this scenario, the three commissioners who vote against
enforcement become the “controlling Commissioners.”43
Creating a majority-vote requirement in a Commission with an even
number of members was a compromise between two policy goals. On the one
hand, Congress was fearful that the FEC could be used “for partisan misuse
or for administrative action which does not comport with the intent of the
enabling statute.”44 If a party controls the FEC, the party could entrench itself
into permanent power by enacting campaign finance regulations to the party’s
benefit or only investigating its political opponents. Accordingly, the risks of this
potential abuse are particular to the FEC in contrast with other independent
agencies.45 On the other hand, Congress also recognized that the Commission
needed to be independent to enforce the law.46 The way it balanced those two
interests was the four-vote requirement, which Congress believed would ensure
“a mature and considered judgement.”47 Most recently, Lee E. Goodman, former
Chair and Commissioner of the FEC, called the four-vote requirement one of
the agency’s “most prudential features.”48 Requiring four votes stops the FEC
from being captured by one party and guarantees that members from both major
political parties agree before the FEC can proceed.

C. Structural Collapse
While the apparent purpose of the structure was bipartisan support and
considered judgement for the most significant actions, critics argue that since the
40
See id. § 30106(c); Brooks Jackson, Broken Promises: Why The Federal Election
Commission Failed 28 (1990) (“The new law also required four of the six commissioners to vote
affirmatively for any commission action to be taken . . . .”).
41
See Thomas & Bowman, supra note 13, at 590 (arguing that the four-vote requirement
was established “to ensure that the Commission would not become a vehicle for partisan
purposes . . . .”).
42

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 892 F.3d 434, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

43

Id.

44

H.R. Rep. No. 94-917, at 3 (1976).

45

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 188.

46

H.R. Rep. No. 94-917, at 3.

47

Id.

Lee Goodman, The FEC’s Problems Aren’t with the GOP, Politico Mag. (May 10, 2015),
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/the-fecs-problems-arent-with-the-gop-117798
[https://perma.cc/J98X-UEXC].
48
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beginning, the Commission was “set up for deadlock and political shenanigans.”49
Rather than creating an independent agency with enough tools to succeed,
“[t]he design of the agency ensured it would be weak.”50 When there is a
deadlock—because of 3-3 ties or because there are not enough commissioners
to constitute an absolute majority—the Commission cannot move forward to
conduct investigations, enact rules, advise aspiring candidates, or pursue civil
action when there is a campaign finance violation.51 As such, it is “possible for
commissioners of one party to block any legal action against their own presidential,
House, and Senate candidates when they violate election laws.”52 Ties are a clear
consequence of having majority rule in a commission with six members. When
ties are combined with a requirement that there cannot be more than three
members from each political party, which ultimately results in a Republican and a
Democratic bloc, it leads to a higher possibility of deadlocks, especially on a topic
as politically ingrained as campaign finance.
But how frequent are these deadlocks? Is this “institutional bias in favor
of inaction” or “recipe for gridlock” real or imagined?53 Before delving into the
magnitude of deadlocks, it is necessary to understand the process by which the
FEC investigates campaign finance violations. Normally, the process starts when a
third-party complains against a person or entity for violating campaign finance law.
This complaint opens a “Matter Under Review” (MUR). After the respondent is
given an opportunity to reply, the general counsel of the Commission investigates
and determines whether there is “reason to believe” there was a violation.54
Afterwards, the FEC has three options: (1) find “reason to believe,” (2) dismiss
the matter pursuant to its prosecutorial discretion, or (3) find no “reason to
believe.”55 Each of these decisions requires the affirmative vote of four members.56
Accordingly, when the matter fails to obtain four votes—for example, because

49
Robert G. Boatright, The Deregulatory Moment?: A Comparative Perspective on
Changing Campaign Finance Laws 62 (2015); see also Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections,
2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135, 154 (2013) (“An equally plausible explanation can be couched as a
legislative attempt to delay and ultimately prevent major electoral reforms by setting up such an
agency structure.”).
50

Jackson, supra note 40, at 27.

52 U.S.C. § 30106(c) (2018) (“[A]ffirmative vote of 4 members of the Commission shall
be required in order for the Commission to take any action in accordance with paragraph (6), (7),
(8), or (9) of section 30107(a) of this title . . . .”).
51

52

Jackson, supra note 40, at 64.

Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation, supra note 10, at
1431; Ellen L. Weintraub & Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign Finance Disclosure
in India and the United States, 11 Election L.J. 241, 258 (2012).
53

54

Federal Election Commission, supra note 36, at 12.

55

Id. at 12–13.

56

Id. at 5; see 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c).
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there is a 3-3 deadlock—the case will not proceed. Four votes are also needed in
other stages of enforcement like finding probable cause that a violation occurred,
or settling and authorizing a civil action.57
The frequency of deadlocks has changed over the years. Between 1996 and
2006 the Commission tied in only 2.4% of the MURs.58 Despite the debate
concerning deadlocks, there were unanimous 6-0 and 5-0 decisions in 78.6% of
the cases.59 But when they occur, deadlocks tend to follow party lines: in 59%
of the 3-3 splits the Republican and the Democratic blocs voted in opposite
directions.60 The problem with deadlocks is that, although they are rare, political
actors can still identify the campaign finance regulations that are less likely to be
enforced.61 Yet, because deadlocks were not as predominant, reformers suggested
re-tooling, rather than complete reform or elimination of the FEC.62
Unfortunately, the FEC has become more and more polarized since 2006. In
2008 and 2009 deadlocks spiked to 13% on MURs63 and increased to 24.4% in
2014.64 The most complete analysis on 3-3 ties on MURs was done by Ann Ravel,
a Democratic Commissioner who resigned in 2017.65 She divided the votes on two
categories. The first group is non-substantive votes, which she narrowly defines as
votes to close a file.66 Substantive votes constitute all remaining decisions.67 She
found that, in 2016, commissioners deadlocked on more than 30% of substantive
votes.68 While in 2006 no MURs closed due to deadlocks, in 2016, 12.5% of the
cases closed because of a deadlock.69 She also highlighted that case closure was not
the only consequence of the deadlocks, since sometimes they were used “to dilute

57

Federal Election Commission, supra note 36, at 20–21.

Michael M. Franz, The Devil We Know? Evaluating the FEC as Enforcer, 8 Election L.J.
167, 176 (2009).
58

59

Id.

60

Id. at 177.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 186.

R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Res. Serv., No. R 40779, Deadlocked Votes Among Members
Federal Election Commission (FEC): Overview and Potential Considerations for
Congress 5, 9–10, 12 (2009).
63

of the

R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Res. Serv., No. R 44319, The Federal Election Commission:
Enforcement Process and Selected Issues for Congress 10 (2015).
64

65
Eric Lichtblau, Democratic Member to Quit Election Commission, Setting Up Political
Fight, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/politics/fec-elections-annravel-campaign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/2VMR-5A8C].
66

Ravel, supra note 9, at 9.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 10.
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enforcement results and avoid holding violators accountable for the full scope of
their conduct.”70 Accordingly, while a case may not close because of deadlocks,
the Commission often only imposes “a slap on the wrist,” since it could later
deadlock on a harsher penalty.71 Consequently, as the deadlocks increase, the fines
imposed by settlement are smaller and fewer. In 2006, the FEC collected $5.5
million in civil penalties in MURs, but only $595,424 in 2016.72
The consequences of deadlocks are not only felt on enforcement matters.
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court decided that the Free Speech
Clause bars the government from limiting corporate independent expenditures.73
The Court reasoned that previous restrictions on independent expenditures
were premised on the lack of effective disclosure of expenditures.74 Yet,
“[w]ith the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide
shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and
elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters.”75 Despite the
importance of disclosures for transparency and accountability, the Republican
Commissioners have been unwilling to regulate and clarify campaign finance
disclosures pursuant to Citizens United.76 For instance, nonprofit organizations
are exempted from disclosures.77 This is known as dark money: political spending
from anonymous donors. Prior to Citizens United, these nonprofit organizations
could not be funded by corporations.78 Yet, the combination of Citizens United’s
recognition of unlimited independent expenditures and the FEC’s unwillingness
to regulate disclosure led to new records of dark money.79 For every dollar spent
as dark money the decade prior to Citizens United, “at least [ten dollars] were
spent in the decade after.”80 In total, nearly one billion dollars of dark money
has been spent on federal elections since Citizens United.81 This is one example
of how deadlocks, because of the institutional design and polarization, affect
transparency, accountability, and democracy.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 11.

73

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).

74

Id. at 370.

75

Id.

76

Ravel, supra note 9, at 12.

77

26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2018).

78
Anna Massoglia, ‘Dark money’ in Politics Skyrocketed in the Wake of Citizens United, Open
Secrets (Jan. 27, 2020), www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/01/dark-money-10years-citizens-united/
[https://perma.cc/M47D-J8LN].
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.
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The FEC’s structure, designed to promote bipartisanship and considered
judgment, has been twisted in this era of polarization to further weaken what
was supposed to be one of the most important independent agencies. Because
of deadlocks resulting from the Republican bloc’s opposition to campaign
finance regulations, “major violations are swept under the rug and the resulting
dark money has left Americans uninformed about the sources of campaign
spending.”82 While Lee Goodman, a Republican Commissioner, contends that
commissioners actually deadlocked in less than 10% of the cases, there can be no
question that deadlocks have become substantially more prominent, especially in
the context of enforcement.83 Michael E. Toner, a lawyer and former Republican
Commissioner, even said that he tells his clients: “Here’s the situation, you have
three commissioners who say this is lawful, and that is something you can rely
on between now and November for your campaign strategy.”84 Another former
Commissioner, Don McGahn, said in an interview that he was “not enforcing
the law as Congress passed it. I plead guilty as charged.”85 These expressions by
former commissioners confirm that now—because of the institutional design and
the salience of campaign finance for both political parties—violations of existing
law regularly go unpunished and candidates have “license to violate the law.”86

III. Structural Redesign: Odd Number Commission
and Non-Deference Approach
Since its inception, critics argued that the FEC’s structure made deadlocks
more likely.87 As seen in Part II, this dire forecast eventually became true. Along

82

Ravel, supra note 9, at 1.

Ashley Balcerzak, Ann Ravel’s Parting Shot, OpenSecrets (Feb. 23, 2017, 12:06 PM), www.
opensecrets.org/news/2017/02/ann-ravels-parting-shot [https://perma.cc/QL7Z-NAXX]; Ravel,
supra note 9, at 1.
83

Nicholas Confessore, Election Panel Enacts Policies by Not Acting, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25,
2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/us/politics/election-panel-enacts-policies-by-not-acting.
html [https://perma.cc/AQ5N-HAUS].
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Michael Beckel, Federal Election Commissioner Donald McGahn Criticizes ‘Overreach’ of
Campaign Finance Regulations, OpenSecrets (Mar. 21, 2011, 12:36 PM), www.opensecrets.org/
news/2011/03/federal-election-commissioner-donald-mcgahn-criticizes-overreach/[https://perma.
cc/8XC5-WXN4].
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Eliza Newlin Carney, The FEC’s Open Hostilities, Dysfunction, and Intimidation Fore
shadowed the Trump Era, American Prospect (Mar. 2, 2017), https://prospect.org/article/
fec%E2%80%99s-open-hostilities-dysfunction-and-intimidation-foreshadowed-trump-era
[https://perma.cc/Y583-GEUC].

Deadlocks, the lack of four votes for significant actions, do not result only from 3–3 ties.
Deadlocks can also occur when commissioners resign and there are no immediate replacements. As
of this writing, the FEC only has three commissioners and cannot constitute a quorum. Editorial
Board, supra note 6. This problem also needs an urgent reform. However, in this Article I focus
on reforms that can reduce the number of 3–3 ties, because this problem is present even when the
Commission is operating without any vacancies.
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the way, multiple scholars and politicians proposed to reform the FEC. As stated
before, my proposal to reform the FEC consists of adopting storable voting.
But before we delve into the particulars of that proposal, this Part discusses two
previous proposals for structural redesign: the odd-number commission and the
non-deference approach. This will provide much-needed context to understand
how storable voting addresses some of their limitations, among them being the
lack of bipartisan balance and the overburden of the federal judiciary. These are
not the only proposals to reduce deadlocks in the FEC. Modest reforms have also
been suggested, for instance, by reducing the voting threshold for the “reason to
believe” determination,88 or when the FEC needs to pursue civil action after it
determines probable cause.89 Moreover, these proposals are not mutually exclusive
and could complement each other. Here, however, I will focus on how these two
proposals—the odd-number commission and the non-deference approach—
could independently reduce the number of deadlocks in the FEC.

A. Odd-Number Commission
An even-number commission will tie sometimes. Thus, a logical reform
is to have an odd number of commissioners, since it would mean that if all
commissioners participate, there will always be a majority for action or inaction.
There are many variations of this reform, which I will call the odd-number
commission.90 For instance, Congress could reduce the number of commissioners
to five, which would make the FEC “more lean and economical.”91 The decisive
fifth vote should be someone politically independent, who does not identify
strongly with either political party. While this commissioner, called a public
commissioner, could still be registered with one of the political parties, the ideal
public commissioner would be someone who “could bring to the commission the
skepticism of entrenched party interests that seems to be shared by non-aligned
voters—and those who have ceased voting entirely.”92 The public commissioner
could be, for instance, a university president, a member of the clergy, a retired
judge, or the leader of a public interest group.93 Congress could also eliminate the

For example, reducing the votes to three, rather than four, when the FEC has to determine
whether there is reason to believe that a violation occurred after the recommendation of the general
counsel. See Thomas & Bowman, supra note 13, at 592.
88

Lauren Eber, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155,
1177 (2006) (“A second situation in which a tied Commission vote should not kill a proceeding is
when the Commission deadlocks on whether to pursue an action in civil court.”).
89

90
Another reform is to have a single administrator. Tokaji, supra note 12, at 186. However,
the most recent congressional bills have adopted the odd-number commission, instead of a single
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practice of confirming commissioners in pairs, with one of each political party.
A separate confirmation and a five-year term for each commissioner would mean
that there would be a vacancy every year.
Other reformers have contemplated a commission with seven members
with terms that would last for one year, as was proposed in a congressional bill
in 1989.94 This would mean that partisan control of the FEC would change on
a year-to-year basis, eliminating the possibility of absolute one-party control.
Structural reforms should empower the FEC to act quickly, because without
reform “a candidate could violate the campaign finance laws, win the election as a
result, be seated, and then be assessed a penalty.”95
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres focused their work on the substantive changes
that are necessary to make campaign finance more democratic. They were
conscious, however, that without institutional redesign the law will only look good
on paper. They also proposed a five-member commission constituted by retired
judges who will place their legacy above party politics.96 Every commissioner
would serve ten years and there would be vacancies every two years.97 These term
limits would entail that “the same political coalition would need to control both
the Presidency and the Senate for six years before it could pack the commission
with a strongly partisan majority.”98 As such, this reform is more feasible, since
neither of the political parties will benefit; the composition would depend on the
electoral results. Thus, the desire for a commission that is both nonpartisan and
decisive were the chief animating concerns of Ackerman and Ayres.
In 2006, a congressional bill proposed a three-member commission with a
strong chair.99 In this commission, none of the members could be affiliated with
the same political party. The President would nominate the chair who would
be one of the three members of the commission and serve a term of ten years.
The chair would have the power to issue subpoenas, order testimony, require
assistance from other agencies, require written reports, among many other powers.
Meanwhile, the other two commissioners, who would also be responsible for the
administration, would serve a term of six years.
Recent bills, however, have proposed replacing the three-member commission
with a five-member one, with an appointed chair and no more than two members
David B. Magleby & Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign
Finance Reform 189 (1990).
94

95

Id. at 191.

Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign
Finance 129 (2002).
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from each political party.100 Similar to the congressional bill of 2006, certain
administrative functions would fall on the chair, “allowing the Commission as
a body to focus on the difficult questions of campaign finance law rather than
getting hung up on squabbles over staffing.”101 However, the most significant
actions—enforcement, rulemaking, and advisory opinions—would require three
out of five votes, thus avoiding “the pitfall of a split vote and deadlock.”102 Finally,
a blue-ribbon panel, formed by experts insulated from political influence, would
recommend candidates to the President.
A bill introduced by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and John Sarbanes, titled
For the People Act of 2019, follows previous bills and reduces the composition
from six to five members.103 The most fundamental break with the current law
is that while there cannot be more than two members from the same political
party, the fifth member must be an independent. An independent will be
anyone who has not been affiliated with a political party “as a registered voter,
employee, consultant, donor, officer, or attorney, with such political party or any
of its candidates or elected public officials at any time during the five-year period
ending on the date on which such individual is nominated to be a member of
the Commission.”104 The commissioners, who will serve a non-renewable six-year
term, will be appointed by the President from a pool of candidates preselected
by a blue-ribbon panel. The bill also replaces the four-vote majority requirement
with a simple majority of the members who are serving at the time, solving the
problem of what happens when the FEC has fewer members than it is supposed
to. There will also be a chair, as stipulated in the congressional bill of 2006.105
While these proposals have substantial disagreements, they all break the 3-3
deadlock by having an odd-number commission, which will reduce the likelihood of ties in the FEC. However, these sets of proposals would entail that there
is not a partisan balance between both major political parties. While the FEC
is normally comprised of three Republicans and three Democrats, under this
reform it would be possible, in theory, for one party to mostly control the FEC.
In an odd-number commission, the impartiality of the decisive vote would always
be disputed. In some situations, the losing party could feel that the other party
captured the agency. Moreover, the controlling political party could use the FEC’s

Campaign Legal Ctr., Fix the FEC: Background Memorandum on New Bipartisan
Legislation to Address a Dysfunctional Agency, (Sept. 17, 2015), www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/
publications-speeches/fix-fec-background-memorandum-new-bipartisan-legislation-address-0
[https://perma.cc/5CGU-B5TQ].
100

101
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powers to its own advantage by persecuting the rival political party. When that
party gains back control of the political branches of government it would seek
to eliminate or reform the FEC. This could start a never-ending cycle of both
political parties trying to control and reform the FEC to their own advantage.
For Professor Daniel P. Tokaji, this cure might be worse than the disease.106
Tokaji evaluates the structure and competencies of the Commission by analyzing
their substantive expertise, their coordination of enforcement, their susceptibility
to agency capture, accountability to Congress and the public, and the compliance
burden on those regulated by the agency.107 Applying these criteria, he concludes
that the Commission “still has some advantages, expertise and resources.”108
Its bipartisan structure avoids the liability that has affected other independent
agencies, like the Internal Revenue System.
Tokaji is also concerned about the susceptibility of agency capture if the
FEC has an odd number of commissioners.109 Even when the fifth member is
an independent, the President can still nominate someone that tilts towards his
party. Others have echoed this concern that most independents lean towards one
party.110 If the independent identifies with one party, the odd-number structure
would allow the Commission to be dominated by one political party, which could
pursue actions with the intent of weakening the rival party.111 A partisan majority
could lead to “quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of corruption that
the FEC was designed to prevent.”112 Because the nature of what the FEC
regulates—i.e., campaign finance—reformers should be wary of proposals that
could facilitate one political party to entrench itself in power.113

106

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 188.

Id. at 184; see also Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87
B.U. L. Rev. 625, 655 (2007).
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108

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 185.
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Id. at 186.

Eber, supra note 89, at 1173 (“Most independents tend to lean one way or another politically,
so an independent member would likely function as a de facto member of one of the parties.”).
110

111

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 173.

Eber, supra note 89, at 1174 (“Having a partisan majority in control of regulating campaign
violations implicates the very concerns about quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of
corruption that the FEC was designed to prevent. Having a party majority on the Commission
would provide the party in power an opportunity to manipulate elections and thus create a dynasty
for that party. Certainly, the mere structure would lead to the appearance of corruption even if not
actually used by the party in power to entrench itself.”).
112

113
R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Res. Serv., No. R 44318, The Federal Election Commission:
Overview and Selected Issues for congress 22 (2015) (“If Congress chose instead an odd
number of commissioners, how, if at all, might that affect perceptions of the agency’s legitimacy
or partisanship?”).
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Even if these dire outcomes do not materialize, an odd-number commission
still might not be a good idea. While the FEC will be a vigorous enforcer if the
majority of the commissioners align with the Democrats, the same cannot be said
if the majority align with the Republicans.114 If that happens, the Commission
might be even less effective than the current FEC.115 This might end gridlock, but
it will not be efficient. In other words, “the devil we know”—the current FEC—
might be better than “the devil we don’t”—an odd-number commission.116 After
all, discussions about the FEC’s structure should not ignore the value of “sincere
political differences over the scope of campaign finance laws.”117

B. Non-Deference Approach
Any doubt about whether the FEC’s structure affects its enforcement of
campaign finance law “has evaporated over the past decade as the commission
has increasingly stalemated on significant issues.”118 Since Tokaji believes that the
FEC should reduce deadlocks, he proposed giving the tie-breaking authority to
the federal courts while maintaining the FEC’s current structure. This reform
would not entail amending the FECA. Instead, the D.C. Circuit only needs to
overturn its previous decisions and stop deferring to the FEC when there is a
deadlock because of the lack of four affirmative votes.119 According to Tokaji,
the federal judiciary is a better tiebreaker than any independent because it is the
federal institution most insulated from party politics.120 Thus, the federal judiciary
should not defer to the FEC when there are fewer than four votes and it should,
instead, be the final decider. I will call this proposal the non-deference approach.
Several decisions by the Supreme Court regarding the judicial review of
administrative decisions are relevant to understand how this non-deference
approach would work. Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., federal courts determine
whether the rulings of an administrative agency deserve deference on a caseby-case basis.121 Among many factors, the courts should consider the agency’s
thoroughness, reasoning, the consistency of its interpretation, and persuasiveness.
However, in Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, the Court refined its
approach to deference.122 According to Chevron, there are two steps courts need to
consider: (1) whether Congress spoke directly on the question, and (2) whether the
114

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 188.
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Id. at 185.
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interpretation of the agency is permissible.123 When these two conditions are met,
courts cannot substitute that permissible interpretation with their own reading.124
The Supreme Court later clarified in United States v. Mead that, before applying
Chevron’s two-steps test, federal courts need to make a previous determination,
known as “Step Zero.”125 According to Mead, Chevron deference only applies
when “it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”126 However, even
when Chevron deference does not apply, the administrative decision could be
subject to deference under Skidmore’s case-by-case approach.127
In the context of the FEC, the most significant decision, FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, precedes Chevron.128 The Supreme Court decided
that the FEC’s unanimous dismissal of a compliant was entitled to deference under
Skidmore.129 Accordingly, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee clarifies that
courts should generally defer to the Commission, at least when there is a fourmember majority decision. The remaining question is what the level of deference
is when the FEC deadlocks and the matter was closed because there was not an
affirmative vote by four commissioners. This question has not been answered by
the Supreme Court. However, in Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee v.
FEC, the D.C. Circuit, through an opinion by then-Judge Ginsburg, expressed in
a footnote that there should be “judicial deference to the agency’s initial decision
or indecision.”130 Given that the issue was not central to the resolution of the case,
this footnote should be considered dictum.131 Yet, multiple decisions by the D.C.
Circuit have followed the footnote and extended its application.132 Recently, in
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission,
the D.C. Circuit decided that the dismissal of a complaint after a 3-3 tie was not
reviewable because the FEC has prosecutorial discretion to dismiss.133 According
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United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
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Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006).
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to these D.C. Circuit precedents, federal courts must defer to the Commission, or
decline to review, even when the decision was the result of deadlocks because of a
lack of four affirmative votes. While Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
applied Skidmore deference to an enforcement decision that satisfied the fourmember threshold, D.C. Circuit case law extends deference even when there is no
four-member majority.
Tokaji argues that in cases where fewer than four commissioners agree—
including, but not limited to 3-3 deadlocks along party lines—courts should
not defer to the FEC’s indecision.134 Following Chevron and Mead, he claims
that courts should not defer to the FEC when there is no majority position.135
Deferring fails the “Step Zero” analysis since a decision with less than a majority
does not carry the force of law. Accordingly, “[a] dismissal in these circumstances
does not meet Mead ’s second prong: the agency has not exercised congressional
delegated authority to make rules carrying the force of law.”136 Since the law
requires four votes for any significant action, without that majority FEC decisions
should not be binding on federal courts. But while Chevron should not apply, it
is less clear whether courts should defer to the FEC under Skidmore.137 Tokaji
reasons that Skidmore should not apply when the FEC deadlocks, since there is no
agency interpretation. Meanwhile, even if it were to apply, “it is hard to see why
the views of three commissioners voting ‘no’ should receive greater deference than
the three voting ‘yes.’”138 Under this scenario, since federal courts do not need
to defer to the FEC when there is no majority position, the federal judiciary can
serve as tiebreakers.139 Therefore, if federal courts abandon deadlock deference,
they can provide the definitive answer while preserving the partisan balance of the
Commission.140 Along similar lines, Judge Pillard, in her dissenting opinion in
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, concluded that judicial review
of the FEC exists because Congress knew that the partisan balance could lead
to deadlocks.141 Thus, judicial review of deadlocks can stop campaign finance
violations from going unpunished.142
While I share Tokaji’s fears of one-party control over the FEC, it is not hard
to see why federal courts are ill-equipped to handle campaign finance regulations
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on a day-to-day basis. If the FEC deadlocks on every step—the initial “reason
to believe” determination, the finding of probable cause, settlement, or bringing
civil action—federal courts must then review each determination, which would
prolong the process. Federal courts should be the measure of last resort, not the
default way of breaking gridlock in the FEC. Moreover, the increased polarization
and partisanship has also extended to judicial selection and the federal judiciary
more broadly.143 This puts into question how insulated the federal judiciary is
from political influence. Because of how impractical it would be for the judiciary
to review deadlocks, plus the increased partisanship of federal courts, reformers
should look at other paths towards reforming the FEC.

IV. Storable Voting: A Path Towards Reform?
The best-case reform must: (1) avoid the risk of one-party control; and
(2) increase enforcement and compliance with campaign finance law. Ideally,
the FEC would be insulated from political influence. If the commissioners were
truly independent, an odd-number commission could satisfy both requirements.
Unfortunately, because of party polarization it has become harder to separate
independent agencies from political pressure.144 Thus, to avoid one-party control
and the appearance and likelihood of corruption, the FEC should retain the sixmember commission, with no more than three members from a political party.
The current structure is not without criticism. Under current law, nothing
stops the FEC from being made up of three Republicans, two Democrats, and
one independent or member of the Libertarian Party who shares the Republicans’
deregulation policy. The emphasis on bipartisanship leads to political entrenchment at the expense of independents or third parties.145 Finally, since most
independent agencies have an odd number of members, the odd-number
commission would only align the FEC with the political convention. Despite
recognizing these points, it would be best to retain, at least for now, the
institutional political balance within the FEC. For many years, the FEC operated
mostly through unanimous consensus.146 A radical institutional reform that is
associated with political party takeover could lead to corruption and the loss of

Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 261, 262, 266
(2019); Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms, and Federal Judicial Appointments, 16 Geo. J. L.
& Pub. Pol’y 521, 530 (2018).
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144

Ackerman & Ayres, supra note 96, at 130–31; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
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legitimacy.147 Reformers seem to operate under the wishful thinking that three out
of the five commissioners will believe in regulation. But if the opposite is true, the
cure will be worse than the disease.148 Thus, to avert the risk of one-party control,
Congress should keep the FEC as an even-number commission.149
The even-number commission avoids one-party control, but it can still lead
to deadlocks. Therefore, Congress must find a way to reduce these deadlocks
while maintaining six members. Deadlocks lead to severe non-enforcement of the
law. They are so common that political candidates sometimes do not even bother
to comply with campaign finance law. The lawlessness is two-fold. On the one
hand, deadlocks often cause the Commission to not enforce campaign finance
laws.150 On the other hand, politicians and political committees trust that the
law will not be applied to them because of the high likelihood of deadlocks and
inaction.151 As cautioned recently by one former Commissioner, “[t]he deadlock
in recent years not only means that those who have already violated the law are
not penalized, but sends a signal that others can push the legal envelope with little
fear of recourse.”152 Therefore, because of deadlocks, there is less enforcement and
compliance of campaign finance regulations.
But how can Congress reduce deadlocks while maintaining the current
structure? My proposal requires lowering the voting threshold from four votes to
three for the initial “reason to believe” determination to allow more investigations
to go forward, and adopting storable voting to reduce deadlocks in later stages.
This third and final Part illustrates how storable voting can avoid one-party control
of the FEC, while increasing enforcement and compliance with campaign finance
regulations. First, I will explain the idea of storable voting. Second, I will discuss
how the FEC can implement storable voting in the enforcement process. While
the initial “reason to believe” determination will require only three votes, storable
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voting will apply in later decisions, such as the determination of probable cause.
Third, I will pay special attention to the problems of agenda control. Finally, I
will evaluate how this proposal enhances certain policy goals, such as facilitating
enforcement and increasing compliance with the law.

A. Storable Voting: The Idea
Storable voting, designed by Alessandra Casella, is an alternative to majority
rule for binary issues.153 The idea is that, in addition to regular votes, voters have
supplemental or bonus votes that they can use as they wish during multiple
decisions. Votes can be stored for future elections, hence the name storable voting.
If the voter does not use the bonus vote in this election because they did not feel
passionate about any issue, they can use it in the next one. As such, storable voting
builds on the “temporal dimension of voting rights.”154
To understand storable voting, consider the following hypothetical scenario.
A committee with four members meets weekly to decide different proposals that
can either pass or fail. The chairperson of the committee is the agenda setter,
and he decides how many proposals are on a particular weekly meeting and the
order of the voting. Each member has a storage of votes that they can use every
month. In this particular committee, every member has thirty regular and twenty
bonus votes to be distributed among thirty proposals every month. During the
first week, six proposals are on the table. Commissioner A and Commissioner B
feel passionate about the first proposal, so each give it three votes (one normal
vote + two bonus votes). Meanwhile, Commissioner C feels neutral (one normal
vote) and Commissioner D is against it (one normal vote + one bonus vote).
They do not know how the other commissioners are voting. According to the
voting, the proposal wins by a 7-2 margin, but with the consequence that the first
two commissioners lost two bonus votes, while Commissioner C, who was more
indifferent, stored votes for a future issue he cares more strongly about, either that
same week or in the future.
Storable voting can apply in many voting contexts: commissions, shareholder
meetings, legislatures, and even referendums. For example, imagine a situation in
which a commission of four members will consider twenty matters over a period
of four weeks. Each commissioner is given an initial stock of twenty bonus votes,
in addition to their twenty regular votes, for a total of forty votes. In this voting
situation, each commissioner must determine two fundamental things before
voting. First, the direction of their preference: whether they are for or against
the proposal. Then, the intensity of their preference: whether they will use their
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extra votes and how many of them they will use. To determine their intensity, the
commissioner will also have to enter a murky territory: guessing how the others
will use their bonus votes. This is the element of voting strategy, which will depend
on “the number of proposals that remain to be voted upon, and the number
of votes still held by each of the other members.”155 Each commissioner votes
without knowing how the other commissioner will vote. While commissioners
are not forbidden from collaborating with one another, the utility of storable
voting rests on the uncertainty regarding how the other commissioners will use
their bonus votes. For every Yes/No decision, the outcome that gets the most
votes will triumph, regardless of how many commissioners voted in that direc
tion. Thus, any decision can have different patterns of votes.
Studies have shown that commissioners can increase the utility of storable
voting if they vote according to their preferences.156 Monotonicity, which Casella
describes as the voting strategy of “casting more votes when the decision on
the table is more important,”157 is a central aspect of storable voting. If every
commissioner votes according to their preferences, each commissioner will win
more often than under majority rule on the issues they care about the most.158
Storable voting accomplishes several objectives. First, voters will have a
greater chance of winning in topics that matter more to them, while having a
lower probability in those that matter less. Second, there is a higher probability of
minority victories, even though every individual is treated identically and has the
same number of votes. Finally, storable voting addresses the problem of minority
disenfranchisement, because the minority can never win under a majority system.

B. Storable Voting in the FEC
While storable voting was designed to protect minority rights, Congress
should apply it in the FEC to reduce deadlocks. As we have seen, deadlocks are
more common in the enforcement context.159 Many MURs end with a deadlock,
even when the general counsel advises the Commission that there is “reason to
believe” that a violation occurred. Accordingly, deadlocks during enforcement
decisions are more pervasive and lead to significant non-enforcement of the
law. By contrast, rulemaking and advisory opinions are areas in which the FEC
deadlocks less frequently, and there is a smaller, though significant, problem
with polarization.160 As such, I recommend applying storable voting only in the
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context of enforcement: the application of campaign finance regulations to
individual violators.
Currently, the enforcement process starts when a third-party complains that a
federal candidate or a political committee violated a campaign finance regulation.
This MUR is assigned to the general counsel, who advises the FEC on whether
there is “reason to believe” there was a violation. To proceed, the law states that
four members need to agree to: (1) find “reason to believe” and initiate the
investigation; (2) dismiss the matter pursuant to its prosecutorial discretion; or
(3) find no “reason to believe.”161 What tends to happen is that the Commission
reaches a tie on whether there is “reason to believe” and, consequently, the matter
is closed.162
To address this, one alternative is for “reason to believe” determinations
to require only three votes, rather than four, to allow the matter to proceed.163
The United States International Trade Commission—another independent,
bipartisan, even-number commission—has a similar rule in place.164 This
change, by itself, would not stop the Commission from deadlocking on future
proceedings since four members of the FEC are also required for finding probable
cause that a violation occurred, conciliation, notifying authorities, and pursuing
civil action.165 However, if this lower voting threshold is combined with storable
voting, the risk of future stalemate at a later stage is diminished. Therefore, I
would divide the enforcement proceeding into two stages: pre-“reason to believe”
and post-“reason to believe.” In the first stage, the Commission must determine
whether there is “reason to believe” and whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion
to dismiss. In this stage, storable voting will not apply. Instead, if the FEC has
a 3-3 tie, the proceeding goes forward. Thus, the Commission cannot submit
someone to an investigation without at least three commissioners agreeing there is
“reason to believe” that a violation occurred. Meanwhile, to dismiss because of its
prosecutorial discretion, at this first stage or a later moment, four commissioners
must consent.

161

Federal Election Commission, supra note 36, at 12–13.
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Ravel, supra note 9, at 8–9.

Thomas and Bowman would apply this lower threshold only if the general counsel believes
there was a violation of campaign finance law. Thomas & Bowman, supra note 13, at 592. Instead,
I believe that under any 3-3 tie the investigation should carry forward, regardless of the general
counsel’s recommendation.
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authorized to make an investigation upon its own motion, upon complaint, or upon application of
any interested party, one-half of the number of commissioners voting agree that the investigation
should be made, such investigation shall thereupon be carried out in accordance with the statutory
authority covering the matter in question.”).
165

Tokaji, supra note 12, at 186.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

23

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 6

310

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

Afterwards, the FEC notifies the respondent of the “reason to believe”
determination and the general counsel investigates.166 This is when the second stage
begins, which includes settlement before probable cause, finding probable cause,
notifying the Department of Justice, and settlement after probable cause. Storable
voting will apply in each of these votes that now require four votes. Before the
determination of probable cause, the Commission has regulated that there can be
a voluntary conciliation between the respondent and the Commission to allow for
early disposition of the MUR.167 Since this determination is dispositive, this will
be the first step where storable voting comes into play. Here, the commissioners
will get to vote on whether they want to settle the issue with the respondent.
Under my proposal, each commissioner will have one regular vote and they
can only use a maximum of three bonus votes in each decision. Commissioners
can use the remaining bonus votes in the other MURs that are discussed during
this or later meetings. For example, Commissioners A and B do not want to settle,
but believe the issue is not as important as others. They both give the matter
only their regular votes. Commissioner C, however, strongly opposes settling.
As such, he uses three of his bonus votes and his regular vote against settling.
Commissioners D and E really want to settle, and each of them uses one of their
bonus votes, in addition to their regular votes. Commissioner F only uses her
regular vote against conciliation. Final tally: six against settling, five in favor. The
MUR continues.168
The next voting step is the determination of probable cause. At this moment,
the commissioners have the Probable Cause Brief, where the general counsel
recommends to the Commission whether to find probable cause to believe
a violation has occurred or is about to occur.169 The respondent can request a
Probable Cause Hearing and two commissioners need to agree for the hearing
to be held.170 Afterwards, and with the briefs of the general counsel and the
respondent in hand, the Commission will vote on whether there is “probable
cause to believe” that a violation has occurred or is about to occur. Storable
voting will also apply in this determination. If there is a determination of
probable cause, the Commission then needs to: (1) determine whether to notify
the Department of Justice if they believe the respondent acted willfully; and
(2) approve or disapprove the conciliation agreement between the general counsel
and the respondent. Storable voting will also apply to both of these decisions.
Meanwhile, if there is no determination of probable cause, the MUR is dismissed.
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Thus, it is likely that the commissioners will place more importance on the
probable cause determination and, accordingly, use more of their bonus votes.
Finally, if the FEC determines there is reasonable cause that a violation
occurred, but could not settle the dispute, it can bring forward a civil action.
This currently requires a four-member majority. However, if there is already
a determination of probable cause, it makes less sense to require an absolute
majority.171 Likewise, if the Commission already determined through storable
voting that there is probable cause that a violation occurred, the respondent
should not be spared by a subsequent inconsistent vote. Accordingly, storable
voting will not apply at this stage, and the vote of three commissioners is enough
to bring a civil action.
Some of these decisions—settlement after probable cause, notification to
the authorities, and civil action—could be left to the chairperson or require a
different voting threshold. This proposal does not seek to provide all the answers.
However, storable voting can be used to provide a definitive answer in the most
crucial decisions of the FEC, such as the determination of probable cause. The
problem of deadlocks will be solved through two changes. First, by requiring
only three votes for the FEC to determine there is “reason to believe.” Second, by
applying storable voting in the later stages. Thus, even if the “reason to believe”
decision is tied 3-3, the Commissioners can use their bonus votes in later stages—
settlement, probable cause, and notification to authorities—to avoid deadlocking
on later stages. More importantly, once the process starts and the public record is
compiled, it would be harder for the Commission to dismiss the matter if there
was a violation of the law. It will also be easier for the third party, the one who
brought the complaint, to seek review if it believes the Commission’s decision
does not deserve deference.

C. Agenda Setting, Design, and Calendar
The agenda setter plays a crucial role in storable voting. Every voter in this
voting system faces degrees of uncertainty. First, voters might not know on which
future proposals they are going to vote. Second, if the proposals are known, they
might not know the preferences of the other members, which could change over
time. While this may complicate how they vote, “[a]s long as voters can predict
their preferences on average, they can still use their expectations to decide their
strategy and evaluate the welfare potential of the voting scheme, in the knowledge
that sometimes they will overestimate the importance of future decisions and
sometimes underestimate it.”172 But “what happens if one or more committee
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members control the agenda?”173 There is a risk that the agenda setter could
use his powers to drain the bonus votes of the other commissioners and win an
unpopular decision on that basis.
There are two possible ways the agenda setter can control the agenda. In the
first, the chair can only choose the “order in which the proposals are brought to
the vote.”174 The full agenda will be fixed at the beginning of the game; the chair
only decides, previous to the start of voting, the order in which the proposals
will be considered. Here, controlling the order of the agenda serves, if only, as a
communication device—a way for the chair to communicate his priorities. When
the chair controls the order of the agenda, “the bonus vote does matter; the chair’s
control of the agenda does not.”175 Therefore, the distributional effect is minor,
and “[t]he chair can do no better than setting the order randomly.”176
In the second form of agenda control, the chair not only controls the order
but also the content of the agenda.177 The other commissioners do not know if a
certain proposal will be on the agenda, and this uncertainty affects their voting
choices. While in the first situation the agenda is fixed, here the agenda is fluid.
The chair can add issues to the agenda as he goes along. In this situation, “the
chair’s advantage is larger.”178 But as long as the voters employ bonus votes based
on their preferences, the voting system is still preferable to majority voting, where
the agenda setter also has advantages.179 This will be contingent, however, on all
members sharing, more or less, the same knowledge about how the other voters
will vote. But if the chair has superior information about the others’ preferences,
the chair will have an even larger advantage.
Of these two forms of agenda control, the chair of the FEC should, if anything,
only be empowered with the first one: deciding the order of the matters under
consideration. The agenda should be fixed, with every commissioner knowing
which proposals are going to be considered later on. The order of the agenda
could also be arranged randomly, without the chair setting the order. However,
the most important aspect is that the chair does not add matters to the agenda to
drain the bonus votes of the other commissioners.
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How might this fixed agenda look? In 2018, there were a total of 186 MURs,
with an average of sixteen every month.180 This number will serve as the starting
point. The Commission will meet two times every month and it will consider,
on average, seven to eight cases every meeting. The chair will set and order the
agenda, deliberately or randomly, at least one month in advance. As such, all
the commissioners will know the ten to fifteen Matters Under Review that they
will evaluate during the two meetings every month. As mentioned previously,
when the Commission must determine whether there is “reason to believe” that a
violation occurred, three votes will be enough to open the investigation. Storable
voting will not apply in this decision, but it will apply in others where the law
currently requires four votes. Under this example, however, imagine that the
FEC will not consider any “reason to believe” determination, but only matters
where storable voting applies. If there are twelve such matters, each commissioner
will have twelve regular votes and twelve bonus votes to distribute accordingly,
but never more than three in one decision. These bonus votes will expire each
month. The next month they will be granted a new stock of votes, depending
on the amount of matters to be considered. This fixed agenda limits the power
of the chair, which guarantees that every commissioner will gain more if they use
their votes according to the intensity of their preferences. Each commissioner will
win more than with majority voting in matters that they prefer, and lose more
frequently than with majority voting in those they consider less important.
How should the FEC deal with urgent matters that arise at the last minute?
If it is possible, they should be added to next month’s agenda, either in the first
or the second meeting. A different alternative is to include it in the agenda that
has already been fixed, since it is not likely that this, by itself, will outweigh the
benefits of storable voting. As explained above, even when the chair controls
the content of the agenda, storable voting is still favorable to majority voting.
More importantly, these extraordinary situations are not enough to disregard the
proposal. The exception should not make the rule. In 2017, the average number
of days of a Matter Under Review, from the moment it was opened to the day it
was closed, was 470 days. The process of enforcement is long, with opportunities
for presenting evidence, filing briefs, public hearings, and different stages of
conciliation. Nothing stops the FEC from setting up an agenda that is relatively
fixed, with limited exceptions for urgent matters. It would also be wise that the
chair position rotates among Commission members every two years to avoid any
possible advantage the position may have in this or any other situation.

FEC Enforcement Statistics 1977–2019, Federal Election Commission, www.
fec.gov/press/bkgnd/EnforcementStatistics.shtml (last updated Oct. 17, 2019) [https://perma.
cc/3CBE-KY9A].
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D. Policy Goals
While the objectives of storable voting are more salient in the context of
majority and minority voters, they are also present, though in different ways, in
the context of the FEC. First, the commissioners will feel more enthusiastic about
this voting system since the commissioners will be able to succeed more often
than with majority voting. This will be especially true in situations where they
care more intensely about the outcome than the opposing commissioners. For
example, imagine Commissioners A and B care deeply about campaign finance
disclosure requirements, while the other commissioners are more concerned with
coordination between candidates and political action committees. If A and B are
the only two commissioners who are passionate about this, they will not be able
to win under majority voting. Under storable voting, however, they could use
their bonus votes to move this matter forward if the other commissioners are
more indifferent. It is not that some commissioners will be more important than
others, but that each commissioner will have a better chance of succeeding in
those issues that they consider more important.
Second, the institutional balance is maintained, while simultaneously
breaking through the 3-3 gridlocks and giving everyone the same voting power.
Since the structure is preserved, there is a lesser chance that the FEC will be
perceived as illegitimate or captured by one political party. The Democratic and
Republican blocs have equal chance to apply their reasonable interpretations of
campaign finance law. At the same time, the voting system might change the
culture of the FEC. Currently, the commissioners think of themselves as a bloc.
This bloc mentality is a clear consequence of the FEC’s structure and majority
rule. However, with storable voting, the intensity of their preferences over a range
of matters will take precedence over their party affiliation. Because each commis
sioner has multiple bonus votes, it would be next to impossible for them to guess
how each commissioner is going to distribute their bonus votes. Commissioners
will make the most out of their bonus votes only if they vote according to their
preferences. Whereas under the current system the commissioners can reach a
deadlock if both blocs vote in opposite directions, under storable voting this
will only happen in the unlikely event that both blocs used exactly the same
number of bonus votes. While in the tier of the most controversial decisions we
can expect each commissioner to use all their bonus votes, in the other tiers,
the commissioners must consider many factors, unless they want to waste their
bonus votes.
Third, no group of commissioners will be disenfranchised as they sometimes
are under the current system and could be under an odd-number commission.
This enhances the legitimacy of the Commission, while at the same time avoiding
deadlocks and non-enforcement. Currently, the Democratic bloc is powerless
in many cases, since the Republican bloc can paralyze any case if all of its
commissioners stick together. This will not happen under storable voting. First,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss2/6
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three votes will be enough to determine there is “reason to believe” a violation
occurred and initiate the investigation. Second, once the process starts and
storable voting applies, each bloc will be expected to win at a frequency consistent
with its relative size. Storable voting was created to help systematic minorities win
more frequently that with majority rule. This consequence will be reproduced,
at an even larger scale, in the context of two groups that share the same size.
Moreover, even if an odd-number commission is established, storable voting can
still be adopted so the minority wins more often than under majority rule.
Finally, the implementation of this system will lead to fewer ties and,
consequently, more enforcement and compliance with the law than the current
system. Now, the impasse of the 3-3 tie means that the law is not enforced. But
with storable votes, the commissioners will be able to use their votes strategically
and win some of the time, especially when they care more about a particular
outcome than the other commissioners. More importantly, because storable
voting adds an element of unpredictability, it will increase compliance. Currently,
the political candidates and their committees can rely on the near-certainty that
the Commission will deadlock. One negative consequence of the current structure
is that deadlocks “signal to political actors the campaign finance behavior that is
most susceptible to regulatory and enforcement delay or confusion.”181 However,
under storable voting, they will not be able to accurately predict how each
commissioner will use their bonus votes. This should lead to compliance with
campaign finance regulations because of the fear, now more substantial, of being
investigated and punished by the FEC.182 Candidates and political committees
will not know what other issues the FEC will be considering each month or how
each commissioner will distribute their bonus votes.
As with any voting mechanism, there are some drawbacks. One is that there
will likely be inconsistent decisions over similar issues. However, this also happens
with the current voting system. More importantly, federal courts would be
justified to settle the matter, and not defer to the agency when the issue has been
decided inconsistently.183 Moreover, if the voting threshold for “reason to believe”
determinations is reduced to three, federal courts will have a more complete
record if they decide to review an inconsistent decision.
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The second issue is the fear that influential politicians or lobby groups could
pressure a commissioner or a set of commissioners to use all their bonus votes
on a particular issue. The worst scenario would be, for example, one decision
in which four commissioners use their regular votes to find probable cause, one
commissioner uses only his regular vote against the finding of probable cause,
and the final commissioner uses her regular vote and all three of her bonus votes
to vote against a finding of probable cause to save a friend or political ally. The
final tally will be 5-4 against the finding of probable cause, despite the fact that
four voted in favor of the proposal and only two voted against. In a way, this
is an intrinsic element of storable voting: the minority will win if it cares more
about the outcome than the majority. However, there are ways to reduce the abuse
of this voting system. The President should nominate, and the Senate approve,
commissioners that are recommended by a blue-ribbon committee so they are
more insulated from political pressure. The Office of Government Ethics can
pay particular attention to extreme voting patterns and investigate accordingly.
Finally, Congress can reduce the amount of bonus votes that could be used on
each decision. Thus, once the method is implemented, different changes might be
necessary to keep the FEC from being perverted as it has been under the current
system. That is the only way storable voting will accomplish its policy goals.

V. Conclusion
The FEC has been delegated the fundamental task of enacting and enforcing
campaign finance regulations. Without them, “[e]ven when our votes count
equally, inequality of private wealth may distort public deliberation in ways
that are inconsistent with our mutual recognition as equal citizens.”184 But the
structure of the FEC, with its persistent lapses into deadlock, has been criticized
for most of its history. This perversion is growing at unprecedented levels. In this
era of peak polarization, its structure has led to significant non-enforcement of
campaign finance regulations. This crisis calls for an institutional reform. For
many years, the emphasis has been having an odd-number of commissioners, and,
most recently, allowing the federal courts to be the decider by not deferring to the
FEC when it deadlocks. But while an odd-number commission could lead to oneparty control, the non-deference approach would require the federal judiciary
to intervene any time there is a deadlock. Through storable voting, however,
Congress can reduce deadlocks in the FEC while maintaining an even-number
commission. The lower threshold of the “reason to believe” will be followed by
storable voting in later stages. This will lead to more investigations, while also
providing a voting mechanism to reduce the occasions the FEC will deadlock
at a later stage. In this way, storable voting contributes to the enforcement of
campaign finance regulations. Storable voting will allow commissioners to prevail
more often than under majority rule, especially on the issues they care about the
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most. This will stop commissioners from being effectively disenfranchised, as they
are under the current system. Storable voting could lead to a change of culture
in the FEC, since membership in a bloc will not be the most important factor.
Instead, to make the most out of their bonus votes they will have to use them
on their preferred issues. Finally, because of the uncertainty of storable voting, it
could lead to voluntary compliance with campaign finance law. While this might
not be enough to save the FEC, storable voting and other voting systems should
be considered when redesigning this important institution.
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